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Case No. 15001 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This Brief is submitted by Respondents Berg and his Surety, Fidelity 
and Deposit Company of Maryland in response to the Notice dated February 8, 1979, 
from the Clerk of the Supreme Court, which reads as follows: 
In its consideration of this case it appears to the 
Court there is one question which has not been adequately 
covered in the briefs and arguments heretofore presented: 
that is, assuming without presently indicating or deciding, 
that the general contractor, defendant Berg, should be 
entitled to recover, would there be a basis upon which a 
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further award of attorney's fees, as distinguished from 
those assessed as damages, should be awarded to general 
contractor Berg. 
Respondents have assumed from the foregoing Notice that thee 
is questioning the right of Berg, as general contractor, and his Surety to~ 
attorney's fees in the sum of $21,000.00 each (total $42,000.00) againstLig: 
and Todd (the owners of the Incline Terrace Apartments). The pertinentq: 
is raised: " .. as distinguished from those [attorneys' fees] assessed as 
damages . . " , and thus we assume that the Court has perceived the theor 
the attorneys' fees assessed against Berg and the Surety in favor of the two 
contractors being passed on to the owners; that these attorneys' fees consti~ 
damages , which are the natural and proximate consequence of the wrongful 
of the owners in not paying the subcontractors, and involving the generalt. 
tractor and his Surety in litigation with the drywall and electrical contraclo: 
See page 52 of Respondent's Brief and the cases cited of Pacific Coast Title 
Insurance Co. vs. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. , 7 Utah 2d 377, l 
P.2d 906; Armstrong Company vs. Thomson, 64 Wash. 2d 191, 390 P.2d!: 
and City of Cedarburg vs. Glens Falls Insurance Co. , 166 N. W. 2d !6H 
1969). 
The right of Berg and the Surety to recover attorney's fees~ 
bottomed upon the legislative intent in §14-2-1 and §14-2-3, U.C.A., 195 l· 
The statutes provide: 
14-2-1. The owner of any interest in land entering into 
a contract, involving $500.00 or more ... obtain fro~ 
the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract p:rJCe, 
with good and sufficient sureties , conditioned for the 
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faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment 
for material furnished and labor performed under the con-
tract. Such bond shall run to the owner and to all other 
persons as their interest may appear. (Emphasis added) 
* * * 
14-2-3. In any action brought upon the bond provided 
for under this chapter the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be 
fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action . (Emphasis added) 
The 1977 amendment, raising the jurisdictional amount from $500.00 
to $2,000.00, occurred after the cause of action arose in this case. The language 
underlined in § 14-2-1 that the bond be conditioned for the faithful performance 
of the contract is the same descriptive language (inter alia) as contained in 
§14-1-5(1) requiring public bodies to obtain a Performance Bond. In a suit upon 
a public Performance Bond attorney's fees are to be awarded to the prevailing 
party (14-1-8) while 14-2-3 states: " ... the successful party shall be entitled 
to recover a reasonable attorney's fee ... " The provision as to attorney's fees 
being taxed as costs in a suit upon the private contractor's bond became effective 
in 1963, at the same time the legislature amended §14-1-1 et seq. pertaining to 
bonds of public contractors. The legislature obviously intended to bring 
attorney's fees in private contract bonds in line with public contract bonds· 
The Performance Bond which the owners sued upon is 
conditioned upon " . . . Contractor shall promptly and faithfully perform said 
contract . . . " The labor and material bond is conditioned upon " · · · principal 
shall promptly make payment to all claimants as hereinafter defined for all labor 
and material used or reasonably required for use in performance of the Contract" 
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(Ex .18P) . On both bonds Berg Construction Company is the p · · 
_nnc1~anc 
Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland is the Surety. The Labor and l!at 
Payment Bond states: 
Note: . This bond is issued simultaneously with Performance 
Bond m favor of the owner conditioned on the full and 
faithful performance of the contract . 
The Surety Company was paid a premium for issuing the bonds, but most fur 
mental is the fact that it always obtains an application for the bonds (Ex.2551 
and/or an Indemnity Agreement (Ex. 256P) wherein the principal CliffordB1 
and his two brothers agreed to indemnify and hold harmless the Surety Comi 
against all loss costs, damages, expenses and attorney's fees. 
From these bonds in evidence , it can be seen that bonding a 
construction project requires the two provisions as to coverage: (1) the faiti. 
performance of the contract, and (2) the prompt payment for material furni~l 
and labor performed. The legislature has been well aware of the two forms! 
surety bond protection, and required in cases of private construction contra-
exceeding $500.00 or more (now $2,000. 00) the same type of performance 'oo: 
as is required in public contracts. Both 14-1-5 and 14-2-1 require a bond 
conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract. This is consisteru' 
the surety industry's standard practice of issuing a Labor and Material Payr 
d Bond simultaneously with a Performance Bond. The general contractor an 
Surety are entitled to assume, as per the Performance Bond, that the owner' 
perform owner's obligations under the contract, to-wit: pay the agreed upoc 
contract price . 
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In this case the owners sued the general contractor and the Surety 
on the Performance Bond, first in the sum of $387 079 45 (R A 5) th 
, . , - ; en amended 
their Complaint to allege overpayment of $600,495.45 plus attorney's fees of 
$35,000.00 (R, C-636). At trial, the owners' exhibit 148d summarized their 
accounting and claimed that there had been an overpayment by them to Clifford 
Berg of $82, 640.00. The owners claimed that Berg and the Surety owed the 
subcontractors Murray Electric ($61, 693. 01) and Claron Bailey ($42 ,653. 68) on 
the Payment Bond, and in addition, owed the owners $82,640. 00 overpayment to 
be recovered upon the Performance Bond. However, the jury found upon proper 
evidence that Berg was entitled to judgment of $159 ,148. 68 which allowed him 
sufficient funds to pay the two subcontractors and obtain a net recovery of 
$54.801.99. 
The construction contract between Berg and the owners did not have 
a provision for payment of attorney's fees. However, the owners were suing 
Berg (as principal) and the Surety on the Performance Bond, and at the same 
time claiming that these two obligors on the Payment Bond should pay the unpaid 
subcontractors. The Findings of Fact as set forth at pages 3 and 4 of Respondent's 
Brief show that Lignell commenced making payments directly to the sheetrocker 
and the electrician, then ceased making any final payment or settlement with 
them, causing them to sue Berg and the Surety on the Payment Bond. Attorney's 
fees were not awarded to Berg and the Surety on the legal theory that Berg 
proved he was entitled to an unpaid balance upon his contract, but because 
Berg and the Surety were the successful parties in the action brought against 
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them upon the Performance Bond by the owner The T 'al c 
· r1 ourt saw this 
distinction, and stated in its Memorandum Decision· "That Western B · 
• , ailey,C:r 
Murray, Berg and Fidelity are the successful parties within the pr · · OVlS!onsr 
Chapter 14, U.C.A., 1953" (R,C 1395). 
The entire case was a tedious difficult accounting matter d 
' Uelo: 
the fact that Lignell kept no ledger of the electrical extras which he request! 
or required. The owners counterclaimed against, and disputed directly wit 
subcontractors. Lignell's nonpayment required the subcontractors to suec: 
the Payment Bond. Lignell further claimed that he had overpaid Berg in the 
sum of $600,495. 45. Berg and the Surety proved to be the successful party 
concerning this demand. 
Because of this interplay between the subcontractor's suit ontn; 
Payment Bond caused by Lignell' s control of the payment of moneys (not Beri 
and the suit on the Performance Bond, the Court must view Chapter 2 of Titl1 
in light of the overall legislative intent. The statute is intended to require~. 
ment for all construction work done, and improvement of the owner's propert 
If the owner fails to obtain the required bond, he is personally liable to allf 
sons who have furnished materials (14-2-2, U. C.A. , 1953). lf the owner de· 
cided to go ahead and pay the subcontractors, with notice to the Surety • the 
d 'fhe owner could sue on the Performance Bond to recover overpayment • an 1 
were the successful party he would be entitled to recover his attorney's fees 
their attorni Thus, we have a situation where the subcontractors can recover 
't ttorney's fees fees in a suit on the Payment Bond, the owner can recover Is a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-7-
a suit on the Performance Bond, and the general contractor and the Surety 
should likewise be entitled to recover their attorney's fees in a case where they 
are the successful parties, to show that the owner wrongfully brought suit for 
overpayment. The legislature clearly intended that a general contractor (who 
is always required to indemnify the Surety in order to provide the Payment Bond 
and Performance Bond) should be treated fairly and equitably, if he were the 
successful party in a suit brought upon the Bonds. 
There are many cases which announce the rule that the statutory 
law of the State is an implied term of any contracts or bonds made in regard to 
that subject. 
In Quagliana vs. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P. 2d 301 
(Utah June 27, 1975), the opinion states: 
Insofar as a municipal ordinance is applicable to 
a contract , it is by operation of law an implied term of 
that contract . 
In State ex rel Building Owners, Etc. vs. Adamany, 219 N.W. 
2d 274, 64 Wis. 2d 280, the court reviews the prior Wisconsin doctrine and 
concludes: 
This court adheres to the basic philosophy of Kuhl, 
supra, that an unequivocal legislative declaration of 
public policy, made either before or after the exe~u­
tion of a contract, becomes a part of that contract 1f. 
the legislature makes it clear that such is .its ~tent10n 
and if it can be determined, either by recitals m the 
legislation or by judicial notice, that vital .public . 
interest will be impaired if the legislation 1s not giVen 
effect and vital interests will be enhanced by enforce-
ment of the legislation. 
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In Sterling Engineering & Constuction Co. vs. Town of 
Burrill ville Housing Authority, 279 A. 2d 445 (R.I. July 1971) the 
' ' courts· 
It is a fundamental rule that all contracts are made 
subject to any law prescribing their effect or conditions 
to be observed in their performance. The statute is as 
much a part of the contract as if the statute had been 
actually written into the contract . 
The requirement that a contractor on a public or private constr. 
project furnish a labor or material Payment Bond and a Performance Bonds;· 
a highly commendable purpose: to assure all suppliers and laborers that th1; 
will be paid. The Surety Bonds are liable under the statute for attorney's il 
to both the successful owner, and successful subcontractor. But the legislat 
did not mandate payment of attorney's fees only against the Bonds. The "p~ 
vailing party" (14-1-8) or the "successful party" (14-2-3) is entitled tore~ 
attorney's fees . The statutes incorporate into every Payment Bond and Perle 
mance Bond a reciprocal or mutual obligation governing attorney's fees. 
Respondents Berg and the Surety urge again that the Supreme 
Court include an order in its opinion that the attorney's fees incurred in the 
appeal to this court be awarded to respondents, upon proof of time spent, al 
a reasonable hourly rate. A case granting attorney's fees on appeal in a sui: 
upon a road contractor's payment bond is Tiffany Construction Co. vs. 
Kelley Construction Company, 539 P. 2d 978, 24 Ariz. App · 504 · 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER 
Richard H. Nebeker . and 
Attorney for Respondent Fidellty 
Deposit Company of Maryland 
-
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WILFORD A. BEESLEY 
Attorney for Respondent Berg Brothers 
Construction Company 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Supplemental Brief of 
Defendants-Respondents were mailed to Earl D. Tanner Associates, attorneys 
for Appellants, 345 South State Street, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this liz_ day of February, 1979. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 




Case No. 15001 
CLIFFORD M. BERG . . . and 
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY 
OF MARYLAND, a corporation, 
t ~ l F 0 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
ADDITIONAL PAGES 9 and 10 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FE8 211979 
-----··----------
Ciorl:, Supr!:r.'lo Cc•1d U' ~'~ 1 • 
At the time of supplemental oral argument before the Court on 
February 20, 1979, counsel for Appellants made the assertion that there were 
no pleadings or findings by Defendants-Respondents to sustain the judgment 
for attorneys' fees. An examination of the record will not sustain this allegation. 
First, in the action brought by plaintiff Copinga/Greenwood, Berg cross-claimed 
(R. 249) against the owners to recover all amounts adjudged in favor of Copinga 
and Greenwood in the following language: 
1. That plaintiffs Hendrik Copinga and Brent Greenwood 
d/b/a Western Drywall, a partnership and third-party plaintiff 
Claron Bailey have claimed herein against defendants and cross-
plaintiffs Clifford M. Berg and William Berg d/b/a Berg Brothers 
Construction Company, a partnership in the sum of $56,786. 43 
and $42,786.43, respectively, together with attorney's fees for 
a contract balance allegedly due and owing plaintiffs and third-
party plaintiff as a result of construction of the Incline Terrace 
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Apartments owned by cross-defendants E. Keith Lignell and 
Burton M. Todd. . . 
* * * 
3 . That all of the alleged claims against the defendants 
and cross-plaintiffs Clifford M. Berg and William Berg d/b/a 
Berg Brothers Construction Company by plaintiffs Hendrik 
Copinga and Brent Greenwood d/b/a Western Drywall, a par-
tnership and third-party plaintiff Claron Bailey are the liability 
of cross-defendants E. Keith Lignell and Burton M. Todd as 
owners under said construction project; that these cross-plaintiffs 
are entitled to judgment against cross-defendants for any amounts 
adjudged to be due and owing herein by these defendants and 
cross-plaintiffs Clifford M. Berg and William Berg d/b/a/ Berg 
Brothers Construction Company to plaintiffs Hendrik Copinga 
and Brent Greenwood d/b/a Western Drywall or third-party 
plaintiff Claron Bailey. 
In the action brought by subcontractor Comstock-Murray Electric, 
Berg also cross-claimed against the owners to recover all amounts adjudged in 
favor of the electrical subcontractor (R. 29) . Each of these actions included 
specific allegations for recovery of attorneys' fees. 
Second, Berg (R. 827) and Surety (R. 825) both pleaded by 
counterclaim against the owners (to the Amended Complaint brought by the 
owners on the Performance Bond) to recover attorneys' fees pursuant to the 
bonding statute, 14-2-3, U .C .A. The language of the Berg Counterclaim is as 
follows: 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Defendants Clifford M. Berg and William R. Berg, d/b/a 
Berg Brothers Construction Company complain of the plaintiffs 
E . Keith Lignell and Marian H . Lignell, his wife, and Burton M. 
Todd and Phyllis W. Todd, his wife, and allege as follows: 
1. Defendants incorporate herein their answer~ to 
paragraphs 12 and 13 of plaintiffs' Third Cause of ActJOn · 
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2. Defendants Clifford M. Berg and William R. Berg d/b fa 
Berg Brothers Construction Company as principals on the perfor-
mance and payment bond furnished the same pursuant to Chapter 
2 of Title 14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The statute provides as 
follows: 
"In any action brought upon the bond provided for under 
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." 
(14-2-3) 
3. Plaintiffs at the present time owe the subcontractors 
Copinga and Greenwood and Comstock Electric and Murray 
Electric a sum of money for the work performed by said subcon-
tractors on the Incline Terrace Apartments , and plaintiffs further 
owe Berg Brothers Construction Company a sum of money for the 
work performed by the general contractors as alleged in prior 
Complaints, Cross-claims and Counterclaims filed herein. 
4. Pursuant to the provisions of 14-2-3, these defendants 
are entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by 
the court which defendants allege to be the sum of $35,000.00 
for attorney's fees and expenses. (R. 827 at 831) 
The allegations in the Surety's Counterclaims against the owners are 
practically identical to the foregoing allegations of Berg's Counterclaim (R.825). 
Third, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are reproduced 
in full at pages 3 to 8 of the Brief of Defendants-Respondents· Findings, numbers 
4 through 14, inclusive, clearly establish the award of attorney's fees. The 
evidence concerning, and the matter of attorney's fees (by stipulation of all 
counsel), was not submitted to the jury. The statute (14-2-3 U .C .A.) provides 
that attorneys' fees shall " . . . be fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action" (Emphasis added). The trial court very carefully 
followed the statute. 
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Citation to the pleadings was not formerly furnished in the Brief 
of Defendants-Respondents because Appellants' points on appeal did not raise 
any issue as to lack of pleadings to sustain an award of attorneys' fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wilford A. Beesley 
Richard H. Nebeker 
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